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TRINE 
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It is unfair to say that the Monroe Doctrine was a mere 
pronunciamento based on provincialism and selfishness, 
and that it has never served any useful purpose. 
True, one of its earlier basic ideas was the natural sepa-
ration between the old and the new world-an idea of two 
separate spheres which was unwarranted however much it 
may have seemed desirable to Jefferson in the Napoleonic 
period of "eternal war" in Europe. This idea of isolation 
was never a vital principie of the doctrine. The United 
States was a world power from the beginning and early 
felt the need of naval bases in the Mediterranean. As a 
world power it has rights in Europe, Mrica and Asia. 
True, the Doctrine was largely due to self interest, to-
gether with the feeling that the United States was logically 
the political leader among the American powers. Secre-
tary Adams in his instructions to Rush, on November 
29, 1823, said: "American affairs, whether of the northern 
or southern continent,. can henceforth not be excluded from 
the interference of the United States. All questions of 
policy relating to them have a bearing so direct upon the 
rights and interests of the United States that they can not 
be left to the disposal of European powers ani:inated. and 
directed exclusively by European principies and interests." 
The United States, beginning with the transfer of Loui-
siana from Spain to France in 1801 and the apprehended 
transfer of Florida from Spain to some other European 
power in 1811, has steadily opposed any European acqui-
sition of American territory which as a European colony 
might prove dangerous to American peace and security. 
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The Monroe Doctrine, based upon this principie, has been 
preeminently a doctrine oí peace-especially secured by 
freeing the Americana from the contests of European diplo-
macy and politice. In 1905, President Roosevelt said the 
doctrine as gradually developed and applied to meet chang-
ing needs and conditions, and as accepted by other nations, 
was one of the most effective instrumenta for peace in the 
westem hemisphere. 
Although ita policy was based on self interest, the American 
government under Monroe gave proper consideration to 
the interests of Latin America. Although in recognizing 
the independence of Spanish American countries, it had 
issued a declaration of neutrnlity, Secretary Adams later 
(October, 1823) informed the Russian minister that this 
declarntion "had been made under the observan ce of like 
neutrality by all the European powers" and might be 
changed by change of circumstances. The Monroe Doc-
trine which followed was directly caused by the belief. in 
the right of free peoples to determine their destinies-and 
by it the United States, with unusual courage, beca.me a 
protector of liberty and self govemment in the westem 
hemisphere. Its high purpose and convenient usefulness 
was properly recognized at the time by the weak LatiD-
American republics. It was the outgrowtb. of the sympathy 
felt for Latin American peoples who were struggling to free 
themselves from conditions imposed by European polí-
tica and who had been recognized as independent nations 
by the United States. · Monroe, who previously as secre-
tary of state was familiar with Latin American conditions, 
at first contemplated a bold stand to prevent European 
interference in Spain itself. After the decision to limit 
the scope of active opposition to the threatened European 
intervention in American affairs, he appointed a special 
secret representativa to visit Europe, to watch the opera-
tions of European congresses and to furnish reporta as a 
basis of determination of American policy. Luckily he 
was successful in blocking intervention without resort to 
more active measures. 
The Doctrine has prevented the partition of LatinAmerica, 
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and without any request of remuneration for the service 
rendered. Its unselfish purpose and unusual daring, in 
face oí what seemed a serious peril, gave it a well deserved 
popularity both in the United States and in Latín America 
countries-many of which have in many instances since 
endeavored to secure treaty stipulations based upon its 
principies, or· have invited the United States actively to 
intervene to protect them from the apprehended interven-
tion of European powers or from despots who might pre-
pare the way for European intervention. 
In spite of apparent lapses of consistency, illustrated in 
the case of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (which was sup-
ported as a measure which was expected to free an impor-
tant part of the continent from European intervention), the 
basic principies of the Doctrine, interpretad with proper 
elasticity to meet changing conditions, were asserted with 
success in other later cases. . The most notable cases were 
the termination of French intervention in Mexico in 1867, 
and the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary dispute 
with England in 1895-96-after the famous Cleveland-
Olney interpretation which resulted in a triumph of the 
American demand for arbitration, awakened the entire 
world to the modern meaning of the "menaces of Monroe," 
and caused someone to regard the Doctrine as an interna-
tional impertinence. Although originally a mere declara-
tion of Monroe, nobody since the action of the U nited S tates 
in the Venezuelan affair can surely say it has never had the 
sanction of Congress. 
The Doctrine, although based primarily upon the right 
of Latin American states to govern theinselves, has been 
sometimes erroneously regarded as a doctrine of American 
expansion. It is not based on territorial conquest-al-
though over half a century ago it was sometimes associated 
with that idea. It expresses a duty and a sympathy to-
ward Latin America and nota desire for territory. Ameri-
cana, who logically in their early history established their 
boundaries on the gulf, for a half century have not been 
inclined to encroach upon the territories of their neighbors. 
It is true that much Latin American suspicion of Ameri-
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can territorial designs was justified in the decade before 
the American civil war, when under the influence of Amer-
ican leaders of the southern states, the shibboleth of "Mani-
fest Destiny" was added to the doctrine of national security. 
In January, 1855, Marcoleta of the Nicaragua legation pro-
tested against the projects of the self-styled "Central Amer-
ican Land and Mining company" to encourage immigration 
to Central America, and especially against the nature of 
the "schemes devised against Central America by these 
modern Phoenicians who assume military titles . . . . 
and grasp the sword and musket instead of the plough-
share and ax and shepherd's crook, thinking to make 
conquest of tbe golden fleece which they believe to be 
hung and secreted mnidst thc briars, forests, thickets 
and swamps . . . . under the by no means attrac-
tive and seductive influence of a pestiferous and íever-
giving atmosphere." Suspicion was doubtless increased 
in 1856 by plans for an American protectorate over the 
Isthmus of Panama, formulated in a treaty (between the 
United States and New Granada) whose ratilication was 
prevented by a change oí administration in the United 
States and a revolution in New Granada. These sus-
picions were prominent in producing the project of a Latín-
American Confederacy oí 1856-a proposed alliance which 
was regarded as antagonistic to the United States, and 
which caused Dana, the American minister to Bolivia, to 
propose to tbe Buchanan administration early in 1857 a 
clear statement of American foreign policy based upon 
the Monroe Doctrine, non-expansion in Latin America, 
and treaties of alliance with the Latin American states, in 
order to sustain self government in both Americas. In 1858, 
in connection with the policy of the American government 
to sccure a neutral transit route across Central America, 
Nicaragua issued a manifesto against apprehended fili-
bustering expeditions from the United States, and by de-
manding a European protectorate indicated a line of policy 
which Secretary Cass promptly warned her that the United 
States had long opposed and would resist by all means 
in her power,· fortreasons: .founded·on-.the1political circum-
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stances oí the American continent which has interests oí 
iis own." 
It is true that, after the Gadsden purchase, persistent 
efi'orts were made under the administrations of Pierce and 
Buchanan, not only to extend American influence and do-
main in the West lndies, but also to solve the Mexican 
problem by additional reduction of Mexican territory--<lr 
by the establishment of an American protectorate which 
was expected to result in new acquisitions to the stronger 
country. These efi'orts, largely based on the danger of 
European influence and apprehended European interven-
tion in Mexico, closoo with the beginning of the American 
civil war and with the arrival of the long-predicted European 
intervention in Mexico. 
Under Seward, the American government sought only to 
preserve Mexico from the Confederates and from perma-
nent European occupation, and the American senate re-
fused to enter into any arrangement by which a proposed 
mortgage on lands of Mexico might have resulted in new 
annexations. Later, although Mexico feared American 
expansion toward the southwest and hesitated to cooperate 
in the construction of railroads across the international 
boundary, the United States government remained true 
to the assurances of Seward in Mexico after the expulsion 
of Maximilian. It sought no acqÚisition of territory in 
Mexico; and m u eh less did it desire territory in Latín Ameri-
ca farther south, except in connection with the later projects 
for the construction of the interoceanic canal whose bene-
fits would be shared by Latin America and the entire world. 
The part taken by the United States in Cuba and in the 
Venezuelan controversy with the European allies has re-
vealed to Latin America the true feeling of the govern-
ment of the United States. It has shown them that the 
mother republic is sincerely and earnestly interested in the 
success of republican government throughout this hemi-
sphere. It has shown that the purpose of the older republic 
in relations with Latín America is not one of conquest, but 
one of sympathy, coiiperation, and assistance. The true 
policy of the American government since the civil war was 
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recently expressed by Secretary Root, and more recently 
by President Wi!son in his Mobile speech. 
The idea of an American interoceanic-isthmian canal, 
which possibly was considered as a minor factor in producing 
the original declaration of l\1onroe, was later a prominent 
factor in causin¡? the United States government to assert 
a status of "paramount intercst," which is now empha-
sized as a cardinal point of American foreign policy growing 
írom the basic principie oí the policy of Monroe and Adams. 
Seward steadily acting under the doctrine of the Iarger in-
fluence and interests of the United Sta tes in American affairs, 
in 1864 began to assert it in a series of negotiations and 
treaties with Central America and Columbia in regard to the 
proposed isthmian canal. His successor, under Grant's ad-
ministration, hopefully expecting the future "voluntary 
departure of European government írorn this continent and 
the adjacent islands," in 1870-77 favored the acquisition of 
San Domingo, as a rneasure of national protection to pre-
vent the apprehended danger of its control as a possession 
or a protectorate of a European power, and to secure a 
"just claim to a controlling influence" over the íuture com-
rnercial traffic across the isthrnus. Later, he endeavored 
to negotiate with Columbia a treaty by which he sought 
íor the United States a greater privileged status and more 
extensive rights oí intervention on the isthmus--a treaty 
which Columbia refused to ratify. In 1880, Secretary 
Evarts aserted the doctrine of American "paramount in-
terest" in projects of interoceanic canal cornmunication 
across the isthmus, and the right to be a principal party 
to any political arrangernents affecting this American ques-
tion. This doctrine received new meaning in 1881 after 
the occupation oí Egypt by Great Britain which already 
owned a controlling rnajority of the stock of the Suez Canal, 
and again after the events of the American intervention 
in Cuba which brought new opportunities, new duties and 
new responsibilities to the United States. The construc-
tion of the canal under American control was the logical 
conclusion of a long series of events; and the wisdorn of the 
diplomacy andvpolicy :which .seized¡ ,opportunity by the 
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forelock, and terminated the long period of discussion and 
delay, can safely be submitted to the test of time. 
Although changed conditions in both hemispheres, and of 
motive power on the ocean, ha ve modified the earlier mean-
ing of the Monroe Doctrine, and may still further modify 
it, its main basic principie for America has not been aban-
doned. This principie is not obsolete. It has been re-
tained on the broad ground of national welfare, in spite of 
the defects in Latin American governments so frequently 
resulting in troubles due to unpaid claims; and European 
powers have recently shown a readiness to accept it at the 
Hague Conference and in connection with the Venezuelan 
debt question of 1902. The latter incident, according to 
leaders in England, gave the Monroe Doctrine an immensely 
increased authority. Mr. Balfour, approving the American 
policy, suggested that the United States should more ac-
tively enter into an arrangement by which constantly-
occurring difficulties between European powers and cer-
tain states in Latin America could be avoided. 
Unless we have reached the conclusion that all Latin 
America might be better under European control, and that 
this control would not seriously threaten the peace and 
permanent interests of the United States, at least one im-
portant principie of the Doctrine should still be retained 
as a fundamental part of American foreign policy. Under 
whatever name, and however modified to suit the conditions 
and needs of American foreign policy, it is still a useful 
principie. It may fitly be called the doctrine of national 
defense, which in its results may be regaroed also as a doo-
trine of Pan-American defense. In America the United 
States government has duties and responsibilities which can 
not be abandoned to the merey of trans-oceanic powers, nor 
submitted to the decision of international conferences or 
tribunals. It must attend to the larger interests of the 
United States-without any unnecessary interference with 
the larger interests of other powers. Certainly, in Mex-
ico at present, the United States has a larger interest than 
that of any European power. She has a far greater interest 
than any other power in the restoration of peaee and the 
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establishment of a government that has proper basis or 
permanency in its method of selection and in its policies 
for adjustment of problema that press for solution. Peace 
in America, on the basis of good government, is more im-
portant to the United States than it is to Europe, and more 
important to the United Sta tes than peace in Europe. 
The present basis of policy is the paramount interest of 
the United States in American affairs-a special interest 
which, especially in the Caribbean, can be shared with no 
other power, and perhaps would be questioned by no Eu-
ropean power. After the war for the relief of the Cuban 
situation in 1898-a war which made the United States 
an Asiatic power and brought it in contact with European 
politics in the far East-American paramount interests in 
the W est Indies, and in the Caribbean, were greatly in-
creascd and especially found expression in the messages 
of President Roosevelt and in various acts of the American 
government-including the construction of the Panama 
Canal which has clearly increased the importance of main-
taining around the Caribbean the American policy against 
the interference of European powers. In this region the 
United States has duties and responsibilities which it may 
not willingly share with any European power. 
Farther south, the assertion and maintenance of the doc-
trine of non-intervention has been rendered less necessary 
by the growth of several more perfect, orderly and stable 
governments, which themselves are the best guarantors of 
the Doctrine. The larger Latin American republics, in which 
governments have reached sure bases of permanence, may 
properly be invited by the United States to cooperate 
or participate in the consideration of mutuallarger interests 
in America, and to share the responsibilities incident to the 
American principie of defense of American nationalities. 
Doubtless by such a continental extension of the means 
of safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American neigh-
bors through the sobering effect of actual responsibility 
would cease to misinterpret the motives of the mother re-
public in the Caribbean and on the Isthmus. 
Whether we admit¡Olnev,'s.declaration that "the United 
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States is practically sovereign on this continent," it secms 
clear that as a result of its geographic situation it has a 
"paramount interest" in the western hemisphere which 
imposes certain rules of policy toward Latin American neigh-
bors-especially toward those in the Caribbean and around 
its shores. This doctrine was at the basis of the Cuban 
intervention, of the construction of the Panama canal under 
American control, of the declaration of policy to Germany 
in connection with the blockade of Venezuelan ports, of the 
policy in Santo Domingo, of the recent policy in Nicara-
gua, and of the present Mexican policy. The essential 
idea is to prevent the danger of European intervention 
which might result in the acquisition of territory. 
A possible result of this policy is the intervention of 
the United States to set in order the conditions which invite 
foreign intervention. Such a policy, however undesirable, 
may be necessary unless the United States is ready to aban-
don its past policy in regard to European intervention. 
Actual intervention oí force of arms is a possible necessity 
which the American government, judging for itself the ac-
tion which the situation may require, would undertake 
only after much forbearance and as a last resort to secure 
peace between warring factions, and to prevent dangers 
more serious. Such intervention was contemplated in 
Mexico in 1867, but was fortunately avoided by the French 
withdrawal which precipitated the fa!! of Maximilian. 
In case a European power seeks redress for an injury 
which can be fairly settled only by occupation of soil, 
the American government might logically be forced to ac-
cept the róle of internátional policemen and assume re-
sponsibility of satisfying the injured party. Against Vene-
zuela in 1902, the United States permitted a military debt 
collecting demonstration with the assurance that no terri-
tory would be occupied. She determined the reasonable-
ness of the demand upon the delinquent government, and 
also the method of collection. In the case of Santo Do-
mingo, she prevented the necessity of European inter-
vention by assuming administrative control of the Do-
minican finances for the purpose of paying foreign credi-
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tors, and with no view to territorial aggression. These 
two cases indica te the purpose of the American government 
at Washington to prevent the use of the non-intervention 
principie of the traditional American policy as a shield 
to protect delinquent Latin American republics from the 
payment of debts, as it was used in the case of the proposed 
joint European expedition against Mexico in 1859. 
The United States has never hada wish to interfere in 
the interna! policies of Latín American neighbors. She 
has had no desire to interfere with those which are orderly, 
and no inclination to interfere with those which are dis-
orderly. But in the case of Mexico she has refused recog-
nition to de-facto governments irregularly or unfairly elected. 
The election of Maximilian by a reported "immense major-
ity" was regarded as a farce. 
The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine places u pon the 
United States a responsibility to prevent its foreign policy 
from becoming a shield to protect the existence of revolu-
tion, anarchy and military despotism which increases the 
debts of neighboring Latin American countries and re-
sults in vast foreign claims for property destroyed. The 
protegés of American foreign policy should more carefully 
seek to maintain orderly and well administered governments 
which will not invite foreign wrath. In Central America, 
the disorder might be reduced by federation; but the prob-
lem is beset by many difficulties. 
The supreme need of these republics is to establish a 
basis by which changes of policies and parties can be made 
peacefully through the ballot box. The continued dis-
orderly condition of affairs must either result in the abro-
gation of the Monroe Doctrine so far as it protects them, 
or in the alternativa of a more active American policy to 
secure more peaceful interna! conditions. It is possible 
that arbitration in sorne form may be applied to civil com-
motions insuch a way asto afford a general remedy if elections 
are free and fairly conductcd. Possibly, sorne plan for the 
establishment of a receivership for delinquent states could 
be devised by a conference of American states. Such a 
plan mightJtprove·rof ~great :va!ue•incsecuring peace-and 
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rnight in sorne instances provide for taking charge oí the 
government pending a presidential election. In sorne in-
stances the plan might result or termínate in confederations 
which would reduce the dangers of future disorder and pre-
pare the way for peace and prosperity. Under the receiver-
ships, ballot reforms and regulation of election systems could 
be inaugurated. The United States as a near neighbor 
stands in a favorable position to take the initiative in the 
consummation of such reforms. 
With the developrnent of orderly governments around 
the Caribbean-governments which can rnaintain for thern-
selves the same principie of the Monroe Doctrine which has 
served as their protection-the United Sta tes will gladly be 
relieved from the often ernbarrassing responsibility by which 
she has sought tO preserve constitutional government and 
peace on this hemisphere--especially in the part of it where 
she has the Iargest share of responsibility for the rnainte-
nance of order. 
